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Summary: Acute alcohol intoxication during encoding can impair subsequent identification accuracy, but results across studies
have been inconsistent, with studies often finding no effect. Little is also known about how alcohol intoxication affects the
identification confidence–accuracy relationship. We randomly assigned women (N = 153) to consume alcohol (dosed to achieve
a 0.08% blood alcohol content) or tonic water, controlling for alcohol expectancy. Women then participated in an interactive
hypothetical sexual assault scenario and, 24 hours or 7 days later, attempted to identify the assailant from a perpetrator present
or a perpetrator absent simultaneous line-up and reported their decision confidence. Overall, levels of identification accuracy were
similar across the alcohol and tonic water groups. However, women who had consumed tonic water as opposed to alcohol
identified the assailant with higher confidence on average. Further, calibration analyses suggested that confidence is predictive
of accuracy regardless of alcohol consumption. The theoretical and applied implications of our results are discussed. © 2017
The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Owing to the nature of their crimes, sexual assault assailants
leave behind biological evidence more often than other
assailants. DNA testing of this evidence can lead to
apprehension and conviction of the guilty. It can also
exonerate the innocent: To date, 349 men, convicted
primarily of sex offenses, have had their convictions
overturned (www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-
in-the-united-states). In the vast majority of these cases, at
least one eyewitness or victim implicated the defendant, by
positively identifying him from a line-up. A recent review
found that the majority of mistaken identifications involved
witnesses or victims who expressed, at the time of the
identification, low confidence in the likely accuracy of their
identification (Garrett, 2011). These real world cases
highlight the importance of studying the factors that
influence identification accuracy and confidence, particularly
in sex offenses. However, only two research studies to date
have examined line-up identification accuracy in this
context. In these studies, participants watched a video that
depicted a male sexually assaulting a woman (Yarmey,
1986; Yarmey & Jones, 1983). This work found that while
the opportunity to view the assailant was associated with
accuracy (Yarmey, 1986), the certainty of the identification
did not relate to accuracy (Yarmey, 1986; Yarmey & Jones,
1983).
The present study extends this small literature, focusing
on women’s ability to identify a hypothetical sexual assault
assailant from a line-up. Further, an estimated 35–72% of
victims in sexual assault cases are alcohol-intoxicated during
the offense (Mohler-Kuo, Dowdall, Koss, & Wechsler,
2004; Office for National Statistics, 2015). Therefore, to
increase the relevance of our work to line-up identifications
in rape cases, we varied whether women were under the
influence of alcohol during encoding, assessing whether
alcohol intoxication decreases accuracy. We also examined
the confidence–accuracy relationship as a function of alcohol
intoxication. If confidence is predictive of accuracy,
confidence should be relatively low when the witness
identifies the wrong person, and it should be relatively high
when the witness correctly identifies the perpetrator. In the
sections that follow, we review the relevant research
background and outline our predictions.
BACKGROUND: THE EFFECTS OF ALCOHOL ON
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY
Police surveys and archival research indicate that intoxicated
witnesses and victims often provide police statements and
take identification tests in criminal investigations (Evans,
Schreiber Compo, & Russano, 2009; Palmer, Flowe,
Takarangi, & Humphries, 2013). Yet, relatively few line-up
studies have examined the impact of alcohol on
identification accuracy (Hagsand, Roos af Hjelmsäter,
Granhag, Fahlke, & Söderpalm-Gordh, 2013; Harvey,
Kneller, & Campbell, 2013; Kneller & Harvey, 2016;
Yuille & Tollestrup, 1990). This handful of studies—
summarized in Table 1—show that alcohol intoxication
during encoding has no effect on accuracy in
simultaneous line-ups (Hagsand et al., 2013; Kneller &
Harvey, 2016; Yuille & Tollestrup, 1990). Dysart,
Lindsay, MacDonald, and Wicke (2002), however, found
that identification accuracy was lower in perpetrator
absent, but not perpetrator present, showups. In a
showup1 , the suspect is presented to the witness alone,
without any fillers. Participants in the study by Dysart
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et al. learned and were tested on their memory for a
person while they were either alcohol-intoxicated or
sober. The authors argued that these results are in line
with alcohol myopia theory, which proposes that, when
people are under the influence of alcohol, attention is
allocated to the most immediate and salient cues in the
environment, whereas peripheral and weaker cues that
conflict with salient cues receive less attention (Steele &
Josephs, 1990). They reasoned that intoxicated
participants in their study focused on a salient feature
(i.e., hairstyle) of the ‘culprit’, which led them to
misidentify the innocent suspect in the perpetrator absent
showup who had a similar feature. However, a recent
study found that participants who were intoxicated during
encoding were no more likely than sober participants to be
influenced by distinctive features during a basic face
recognition task, regardless of whether they were intoxicated
versus sober at test (Colloff & Flowe, 2016). In this study,
participants who had studied faces while intoxicated were
more likely to false alarm to any face, with or without a
distinctive feature, suggesting that intoxicated participants
were basing their recognition decisions on familiarity rather
than identity-based information.
Given this mixed picture, we conducted the present study
to examine whether alcohol intoxication during encoding
decreases line-up identification accuracy. We extended
previous work by presenting the perpetrator within a
hypothetical sexual assault scenario and by employing a
balanced placebo design that controlled for alcohol
expectancy. According to alcohol expectancy theory, people
may try to compensate for alcohol’s negative effects on
cognition by increasing their attention, and this increased
attention may mediate the effect of alcohol on cognition
(Testa et al., 2006). With respect to memory performance,
alcohol expectancy does not seem to have an effect (Hull
& Bond, 1986). However, there is some evidence that
alcohol expectancy in situations that are associated with an
increased risk of sexual assault may lead women to be
hypervigilant and respond with increased caution (see Testa
et al., 2006), which could allow them to compensate for any
negative influence of alcohol on memory for the perpetrator.
To investigate this issue in the context of line-ups, in the
present study, we controlled for alcohol expectancy and
assessed its effect on accuracy and the confidence–accuracy
relationship. We used calibration techniques to do so, which
have not been employed before. We review this literature
next.
ALCOHOL AND METAMEMORY JUDGMENTS OF
LINE-UP IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY
According to models such as trace access theory (Burke,
Mackay, Worthley, & Wade, 1991; also see Green & Swets,
1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), people monitor their
memory processes. When making recognition judgments,
they evaluate the contents of recognition memory and give
higher confidence ratings to items that have greater memory
strength. Thus, if memory strength underpins both
confidence and accuracy, then they should be positively
correlated. A review of early research indicated that the
correspondence between confidence and accuracy was weak
(Wells & Murray, 1984). However, subsequent research has
found that confidence predicts accuracy when there is
sufficient variability across witnessing conditions to allow
for detecting the association (Lindsay, Read, & Sharma,
1998). Sporer, Penrod, Read, and Cutler (1995) found in
their meta-analyses of the line-up identification literature that
the confidence–accuracy correlation is positive, particularly
for people who identify a face from the line-up (i.e.,
‘choosers’). They noted that the magnitude of the
relationship between confidence and accuracy was stronger
than many other predictors of accuracy studied by
eyewitness researchers, including weapon focus and own
race bias. Further, a number of researchers have argued
recently, on the basis of empirical data, that confidence is
predictive of line-up identification accuracy (e.g., Brewer
& Wells, 2006; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013;
Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & Weber, 2010; Wixted & Wells,
in press; Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger,
2015; Roediger, Wixted, & DeSoto, 2012). In a recent
reappraisal of confidence–accuracy literature, Wixted and
Wells (in press) conclude that confidence is strongly
associated with identification accuracy in adults, provided
it is taken under pristine conditions (e.g., the composition
of the line-up is fair). Thus, there is now a sizable body of
work and a consensus that confidence can be predictive of
line-up identification accuracy.
There are factors that can affect the confidence–accuracy
relationship, however. According to the optimality
hypothesis, confidence is predictive of accuracy when
information-processing conditions are optimal during
memory encoding (e.g., relatively long duration of exposure,
better viewing opportunity), storage, and retrieval (Bothwell,
Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987; Deffenbacher, 1980). As
another example, under some conditions in which
Table 1. Proportion of accurate identifications as a function of alcohol condition reported in the line-up literature
No alcohol control group Alcohol group
Study
PP
accuracy
PP
n
PA
accuracy
PA
n
PP
accuracy
PP
n
PA
accuracy
PA
n
Mean
BAC
Hagsand et al. (2013)t 0.25 20 0.24 21 0.23 40 0.40 42 0.04–0.08%
Kneller and Harvey (2016)c 0.27 40 0.45 40 0.35 20 0.45 20 0.05%
Harvey et al. (2013) 0.37 30 0.70 30 0.3 30 0.70 30 0.11%
Yuille and Tollestrup (1990) 0.89 35 0.76 33 0.91 22 0.61 23 0.10%
Note: PP, perpetrator present; PA, perpetrator absent; t, there were two alcohol groups, we collapsed across them here for simplicity; c, there were two control
groups, we collapsed across them here for simplicity.
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remembering is more difficult (e.g., relatively short duration
of exposure, long retention interval between learning and
test), people can be overconfident in the accuracy of their
line-up identification (Palmer, Brewer et al., 2013). The
confidence–accuracy relationship also can be weakened
when people fail to take into account factors that might have
negatively affected their accuracy (see Hourihan, Benjamin,
& Liu, 2012 and Mickes, 2015) and when people receive
feedback from the line-up administrator regarding their
identification accuracy (e.g., Wells & Bradfield, 1998).
Therefore, in evaluating witness confidence to predict likely
accuracy, the totality of the circumstances (i.e., from the time
of the crime, to the time of the in court identification) needs
to be taken into account.
How might alcohol affect meta-memory judgments and,
specifically, confidence–accuracy calibration? There is limited
evidence on this issue. When answering general knowledge
questions, participant confidence does not appear to be
affected by alcohol intoxication (Nelson, McSpadden,
Fromme, & Marlatt, 1986). In the context of line-ups, Yuille
and Tollestrup (1990) found intoxicated compared with sober
participants reported lower levels of confidence for incorrect
compared with correct identifications. Further, they found that
confidence and accuracy were significantly associated and
more strongly related for intoxicated compared with sober
participants, suggesting meta-memory judgments are superior
if people are under the influence of alcohol compared with
sober during encoding. These results run counter to the
optimality hypothesis, which would predict a stronger
relationship between confidence and accuracy for sober
compared with intoxicated participants. So why might alcohol
intoxication during encoding paradoxically strengthen the
confidence–accuracy relationship? One possibility is that
people are aware that alcohol intoxication can compromise
their memory, and this awareness attenuates overconfidence.
Palmer, Brewer et al. (2013) proposed and found evidence
suggesting that participants can make ‘theory-based’
confidence judgments. If it is apparent to participants that a
given factor weakens their memory (e.g., divided attention
during encoding), they will still be calibrated because they
take this theory-based information into account when
evaluating their confidence. Applied here, we might predict
that alcohol intoxication during encoding reduces
overconfidence and thereby strengthens the confidence–
accuracy relationship for those who are intoxicated versus
sober during encoding. To elaborate, people who are
intoxicated during encoding might be better calibrated
because they take into account theory-based information
regarding the negative effects of alcohol on memory. This
explanation would account for why Yuille and Tollestrup
(1990) found that confidence was more predictive of accuracy
for intoxicated compared with sober participants.
Yuille and Tollestrup’s (1990) results have not been
replicated, however; other identification studies assessing
the confidence–accuracy relationship report null findings
(Dysart et al., 2002; Hagsand et al., 2013; Harvey et al.,
2013; Kneller & Harvey, 2016). Evidence on the issue is also
limited by previous studies having employed the point-
biserial correlation coefficient (rpb) to examine the effects
of alcohol on the confidence–accuracy relationship. Juslin,
Olsson, and Winman (1996) demonstrated that the
confidence–accuracy relationship is poorly estimated by rpb
and proposed that researchers use a calibration approach
instead. Calibration entails associating objective
probabilities of accuracy with subjective estimates of
accuracy, such as confidence. There are a number of
calibration approaches (i.e., calibration curves, over/under
confidence statistics, c statistic, Normalized Resolution
Index). For example, calibration curves plot the proportion
of accurate identifications at each level of confidence.
Participants are well-calibrated to the extent that accuracy
and confidence correspond across the range of the
confidence scale. For example, calibration is perfect if there
is a 1:1 correspondence between confidence and accuracy,
with participants who report 10% confidence being 10%
accurate, those who report 30% confidence being 30%
accurate, and those who report 50% confidence being 50%
accurate, and so on. Calibration research finds that
confidence can be predictive of identification accuracy, even
when memory is relatively weak (e.g., Sauer et al., 2010).
Even when calibration is perfect, rpb can severely
underestimate the strength of the relationship between
confidence and accuracy because its size is affected by the
underlying variability of the confidence distribution (Juslin
et al., 1996). Therefore, here we extend the alcohol literature
by employing a calibration approach to compare the
confidence–accuracy relationship in participants who were
intoxicated versus sober during encoding.
We predicted lower identification accuracy and lower
confidence for participants who had consumed alcohol as
opposed to tonic water. We also tested whether alcohol
consumption and/or alcohol expectancy (i) weakens the
confidence–accuracy relationship, as per the optimality
hypothesis, or (ii) strengthens the confidence–accuracy
relationship as per Palmer, Brewer et al.’s (2013) theory-
based information model of the confidence–accuracy
relationship.
METHOD
Participants
We recruited 153 female participants, aged 18–32 years
(M = 20.53, SD = 2.28) from the University of Leicester.
The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the
University of Leicester’s Psychology Research Ethics
Committee. Written informed consent was obtained from
participants directly, prior to their participation. Our
participants were all young adult women, because sexual
assault disproportionately affects this group (U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 2010).
Design
We employed a 2 beverage (consumed tonic water or
alcohol) × 2 expectancy (told consumed tonic water or
alcohol) × 2 perpetrator (perpetrator present or perpetrator
absent) between participants design. Women were randomly
assigned to conditions. The outcome measures were
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identification response (identify the perpetrator, identify a
filler, or not identify anyone, i.e., reject line-up), choosing
(choosers or nonchoosers, depending on whether a line-up
member was identified as the perpetrator from the line-up),
identification accuracy (correct or incorrect line-up
response), and confidence.
The study was conducted over 2 years. In the first year, we
used a 1-day retention interval between encoding and the
line-up test (n = 80), and in the second year, we used a 7-
day retention interval (n = 73). Consequently, because
women were not randomly assigned to a retention interval
condition, if we found any effects of retention interval on
accuracy, we would have to interpret this with caution.
During the 2-year study duration, we recruited as many
participants as possible. We randomly assigned 75 women
to the tonic water condition (38 were randomly assigned to
the perpetrator present condition and 37 to the perpetrator
absent condition) and 80 to the alcohol condition (42 were
randomly assigned to the perpetrator present condition and
38 to the perpetrator absent condition). Assuming a medium
effect size for beverage, 80% power, and an alpha level of
.05, we needed 31 participants in the tonic water condition
and 31 participants in the alcohol condition to detect a
significant effect of beverage on accuracy within the
perpetrator present and/or perpetrator absent condition. Our
cell sizes exceeded these numbers.2 Further, our sample size
allowed for detecting a medium sized effect of expectancy
on accuracy within the alcohol beverage condition (i.e.,
within the alcohol condition, 40 participants expected
alcohol and 38 participants expected tonic water) and within
the tonic water beverage condition (i.e., within the tonic
water condition, 40 participants expected alcohol, and 35
expected tonic water). Our sample size was also adequate
(assuming 80% power, .05 alpha) for detecting a medium
size effect of beverage or expectancy on confidence ratings
based on data reported by Yuille and Tollestrup (1990).
Given these parameters, a total of 52 participants were
required in each cell to detect a significant difference
between participants who had and had not consumed
alcohol, and participants who expected versus did not expect
to consume alcohol. Note that we did not make any
predictions about perpetrator presence in the line-up or
whether it would differentially affect accuracy or confidence
depending on the combined effect of beverage with
expectancy; hence, we did not include the perpetrator
condition and the interaction between beverage and
expectancy in power calculations.
Materials and procedure
We circulated around the University campus an
advertisement for female social drinkers. The advertisement
indicated that participants may consume alcohol as part of
the study and that the topic concerned sexual and dating
behaviors. Women who contacted the researchers received
further information via an email, which explained that
participants had to successfully complete a pre-screening,
reiterated that the study was about sexual and dating
behaviors, and stressed that participation may also entail
discussions about sexual assault. We specified this
information so that women could elect to participate with
knowledge about the topic of the study. We invited
interested participants to complete the pre-screening, which
was accessible via a link to an online survey that we
provided in the email.
The pre-screening included the Alcohol Use Disorders
Identification Test (AUDIT), which was developed by the
World Health Organization to assess whether a person’s
drinking is harmful, hazardous, or dependent (Babor,
Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001; Saunders,
Aasland, Babor, de la Fuente, & Grant, 1993) and a general
health questionnaire, which we devised, that asked women to
indicate any prescription drugs they were currently taking
and any health problems they were experiencing. We invited
women to participate if they scored less than 11 on the
AUDIT and if they also indicated that they did not have
any health problems and did not use any prescription drugs
that would cause an adverse reaction to alcohol. Among
the participants who met these criteria, their mean AUDIT
score was 6.00 (SD = 2.55). We asked participants not to
consume any alcohol on the day of the study, nor any food
during the 4 hours prior to their participation time; to the best
of our knowledge, participants followed this instruction.
Women participated individually. When the participant
reported to the laboratory, the experimenter confirmed her
answers on the AUDIT and the general health questionnaire.
The participant then took a urine-based pregnancy test to
confirm that she was not pregnant. The experimenter then
told the participant that she could not be released from the
laboratory that day until her blood alcohol content (BAC)
level was less than 0.02%. If she elected to leave before then,
the researchers would call her a taxi to transport her home.
She was also advised to not drive an automobile or to not
operate heavy machinery for the rest of the day. She then
signed a form to indicate that she understood the conditions
under which she would be released.
We used a portable breathalyzer (manufactured by
AlcoHAWK) to confirm that the participant’s BAC was
0.00%. Next, the experimenter provided the participant with
three cups, which either contained an alcoholic or a tonic
water beverage, depending on the beverage and expectancy
conditions to which she had been assigned. In the alcoholic
beverage conditions, we dosed women with five parts tonic
water to one part vodka to achieve a BAC of 0.08%, based
on their height and weight (i.e., hence, the amount of alcohol
consumed varied across participants depending on their
height and weight), following the procedures of previous
research (e.g., Curtin & Fairchild, 2003). This calculation
translates into an average alcohol dose of 35.67 g
(SD = 3.63 g) across participants in the alcohol group. It
should also be noted that laboratory research investigating
the effects of alcohol on cognition and behavior does not
typically employ dosage levels that result in a BAC over
0.08%. Ethics Committees usually do not permit higher
2 The only line-up study to have found an effect of alcohol on identification
accuracy is Read, Yuille, and Tollestrup (1992). Their participants acted in
the role of perpetrator rather than witness. Nevertheless, the effect size for
beverage in target absent line-ups under low arousal was medium in size
(Cramer’s V = .26, df = 1), and we used this number to guide us in terms
of estimating effect size.
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dosage levels for insurance reasons and to reduce the
possibility of serious adverse events occurring in the
laboratory. In the tonic water beverage conditions, we gave
women three cups of tonic water. In both the alcohol and
tonic water conditions, the cups contained vodka soaked
limes and were rimmed with vodka; here, our aim was to
disguise the alcohol condition to which women had been
assigned. As per instruction, all participants consumed each
cup within 5 minutes.
To control for any psychological expectancy effects of
alcohol and separate them from the pharmacological effects
of alcohol, we used the balanced-placebo design in which
half of the participants in each beverage condition were told
that they were going to consume alcohol, whereas the other
half were told that they were going to consume tonic water
only. Additionally, the cups participants received were
labeled with ‘tonic’ or ‘vodka and tonic’, depending on the
expectancy condition to which they had been assigned.
Thirty minutes later, we administered the scenario. At this
time, mean BAC in the tonic water group was 0.00%
(SD = 0.00) and 0.08% (SD = 0.01) in the alcohol group.
We measured the participant’s BAC level at several time
points while she was in the laboratory. Time points were
approximately every 15 minutes, but as we were measuring
participants between tasks, we occasionally had to wait for
participants to finish a given task before taking the reading.
On average, BAC was at its peak level by the time women
engaged in the scenario. All women began the scenario after
30 minutes, even if they had not reached 0.08%. The
participant assigned herself a five-digit personal
identification number (PIN), which she used when starting
the scenario. The PIN was also recorded on the alcohol
consumption worksheet. The purpose of the PIN was to link
participant behavior in the scenario to the line-up
identification data.
The scenario was written for the purpose of this study,
following the Participant Choice procedure (Flowe,
Ebbesen, & Putcha-Bhagavatula, 2007; Flowe, Stewart,
Sleath, & Palmer, 2011). This procedure heightens the
participant’s personal involvement in the scenario. It allows
the participant to determine for herself whether or not she
interacts with the man depicted and whether or not she
consents to any sexual activity with him. We wrote multiple
versions of the scenario to increase the generality of the
findings. We randomly assigned participants to read one of
16 possible versions, which we composed by crossing four
locations (i.e., bar, her house, his house, and a party) with
four different versions of the man (i.e., each version had
unique biographical information about the man, such as his
occupation, the type of car he drove, his hometown, and
his hobbies). The basic plot of the scenario was the same
across the versions: The participant encounters a man at a
location, and soon he begins making romantic overtures
towards her.
The scenario was computer-based, presented in several
stages depending on the participant’s choices. At the start
of the program, the participant entered her PIN. Then, during
the first stage, the scenario opens with an introduction to the
setting and a description of the participant meeting a man for
the first time; a photo of him (i.e., a head and shoulder shot)
accompanies the text. The male portrayed was one of four
possible men (all were Caucasian and aged 25 years on
average), with participant randomly assigned to see one of
them. The photograph of the man was visible during only
the first stage. The man introduces himself and describes
his music interests, occupation, and hobbies. He behaves
flirtatiously towards the participant. The participant was then
given her first choice: to continue to interact with the man
(e.g., accept a ride home from him) or to ‘call it a night’.
If the participant elected to remain in the scenario, the next
stage of the scenario is presented (e.g., ‘He begins to rub
your back’.). Following this text, the participant was asked
whether she wants to remain in the situation being described
or if she wants to ‘call it a night.’ If she remains, another
stage of the scenario is presented. If the participant remained
in the scenario long enough, she would read that she and the
man have arrived, alone, at either her house or the man’s
house (depending on scenario version). At this location,
sexual activity was depicted. For as long as the participant
chose to remain in the scenario, the sexual activities were
described as consensual. If she remained in the scenario until
the end, the final activity described was consensual sexual
intercourse. The participant could not move backwards
through the scenario; once she made a decision, she could
not change it, nor could she return to a previous part of the
scenario.
If the participant elected at any point to ‘call it a night’, the
rape scenario was presented. If she withdrew before they
were alone at her house or the man’s house, the participant
was told that she and the man parted company after she
‘called it a night’, but later, the man broke into her house,
restrained her, and committed a legally definable act of rape
against her. If she chose to ‘call it a night’ after they were
alone at her house or the man’s house, the participant was
told he had refused to take ‘no’ for an answer, restrained
her, and committed a legally definable act of rape against
her. We provided relatively little descriptive detail about
the rape itself because, for ethical reasons, we did not want
to subject the participant to gratuitous violence. Rather, our
sole aim in wording the continuation was to make it as clear
as possible that a legally definable act of rape had taken
place.
After the participant engaged in the scenario, she indicated
whether she thought the event was rape and whether she
would report it to the police as rape, using a Likert-type
scale, anchored at, 1, Definitely No, and 11, Definitely Yes.
We required every participant to remain in the laboratory
for at least 2 hours to make it more difficult for a placebo
participant to correctly guess her beverage condition.
Participants who consumed alcohol were released after their
BAC was less than 0.02%.
Twenty-four hours or 7 days later, the participant was
emailed with a link to an online survey that presented a
six-person simultaneous line-up test. It is important to note
that we often tested women towards the end of the week
(Thursday or Friday) owing to participants’ availability.
Our lab is not open on weekends; hence, in order to test
women 24 hours or 7 days later, we had to administer the
line-up test online. Line-up identification studies have
reported similar findings for participants tested in the
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laboratory compared with online (Flowe, Smith, Karoğlu,
Onwuegbusi, & Rai, 2016; Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, &
Goodsell, 2009; Mickes, Flowe, & Wixted, 2012).
Additionally, studies investigating other cognitive
phenomena (e.g., stroop, attentional blink) have reported
similar results across laboratory versus online administrations
(e.g., Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013).
The line-up was presented in two rows of three faces. In
the perpetrator present condition, the male from the scenario
was in either position two or position five and surrounded by
five fillers who matched his description. The photographs
were selected from the Radboud face database (Langner
et al., 2010). The individuals in the line-up did not have
distinguishing features, were all wearing black t-shirts, were
the same age, race and build, and had the same hair color. A
number appeared beneath each photo. The photograph of the
male shown during the scenario was different from the
photograph of him that was presented in the perpetrator-
present line-up. In the perpetrator-absent version of the
line-up, the male from the scenario was not present; he was
replaced with a filler. To test that our line-ups were fair
and the perpetrator did not stand out from the fillers, we used
the mock witness procedure. To do this, we recruited another
group of participants (N = 37), gave them only a written
description of the perpetrator (i.e., hair color, eye color,
build, height, and facial hair), and asked them to identify
the person who they thought was the police suspect. We
calculated E0, which measures effective size, or the number
of line-up members who adequately resemble the suspect
(Tredoux, 1998). Across the line-ups, E0 ranged from 4.24
to 5.35 (M = 4.78, SD = 0.43), which is comparable with
the nominal size of the line-ups (i.e., six persons or the actual
number of line-up members), as well as effective sizes
reported in previous research in the lab (Gronlund et al.,
2009). These data suggest that our line-ups were fair.
We warned participants, as per line-up administration
guidelines (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness
Evidence, 1999), that the man from the scenario might not
be present in the line-up. We cautioned them that not
selecting anyone could be the correct answer. The purpose
of cautionary instructions like these is to minimize positive
identifications based on guessing. The participant indicated
her identification response by either identifying a person by
number, indicating that the male from the scenario was
‘Not there’, or by indicating ‘I don’t know’. Identification
accuracy is higher when the ‘I don’t know’ option is given
compared with not given (Weber & Perfect, 2012). In
analyzing the data, ‘I don’t know’ and ‘Not there’ responses
were treated as line-up rejections. Following the line-up test,
we asked participants to indicate how confident they were in
the accuracy of their response using a 0–100% confidence
scale. After submitting their identification responses,
participants were asked what drink they thought they had
consumed, and to indicate how intoxicated they felt when
reading the scenario using a Likert-type scale, anchored
from 0, Completely Sober, to 10, Completely Intoxicated.
We asked women to report their beliefs at the conclusion
of the study because we wanted to maintain alcohol
expectancies in line with what we had told them during
the course of the study.
Finally, we arranged for the participant to return to the lab
for debriefing—more often than not, she came in more than a
week after her participation, owing to tight schedules, and
she was remunerated £4 for every hour that she participated.
RESULTS
Preliminary analyses
We assessed whether beverage and expectancy affected the
stage at which women withdrew from the scenario. A 2
beverage × 2 expectancy analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with stage as the dependent variable indicated no significant
effects. Women tended to remain in the scenario longer if
they had been given alcohol (M = 12.16, SEM = .87 stages)
compared with tonic water (M = 10.07, SEM = .89 stages),
but the difference was not statistically significant, F(1,
149) = 2.81, p = .10. Further, women who expected alcohol
tended to remain in the scenario as long as women who
expected tonic water only (M = 11.65, SEM = .86 stages
versus M = 10.58, SD = .90 stages, respectively), F(1,
149) = .73, p = .39, and the expectancy × beverage
interaction was not significant, F(1, 149) = 1.11, p = .29.
Participants tended to believe that the sexual intercourse that
took place was not consensual (1–11 rating scale, with 1
indicating it was definitely not consensual, and 11 indicating
it was definitely consensual: M = 2.50, SD = 3.26) and to
think that they would report the culprit’s details to the police
if the scenario had happened to them in real life (1–11 rating
scale, with 1 indicating she definitely would not report, and
11 indicating she definitely would report: M = 8.77,
SD = 3.38). Overall, 86% (n = 133) of participants read the
scenario continuation (i.e., they ‘called it a night’ at some
point in the scenario, and therefore, they read the rape
depiction). On average, participants typically ‘called it a
night’ at stage 11 (M = 11.20, SD = 7.73 stages), which
meant that participants tended to consent to kissing and a
back rub but no other sexual activity. Line-up identification
results did not vary in relation to whether women read the
scenario continuation or in relation to the average stage at
which they withdrew from the scenario; hence, to maximize
our statistical power, the results we report hereafter are based
on the entire sample (n = 153).
For the first 56 participants (n = 28 alcohol, n = 28 tonic
water), we recorded the length of time women spent on the
first scenario stage, which was when the photo of the male
actor was displayed. We inadvertently did not record this
information for the other participants. There was no
difference across the beverage groups in the average length
of time that women spent on the first stage (alcohol
M = 10.62 s, SD = 7.42 s versus tonic water M = 8.89 s,
SD = 5.15 s), t(54) = 1.10, p = .32.
Next, we turned to our subjective measures of alcohol
intoxication. First, we examined whether women felt more
intoxicated depending on beverage and expectancy
condition. A 2 (beverage) × 2 (expectancy) between subjects
ANOVA revealed that women who consumed alcohol
reported feeling more intoxicated compared with those who
consumed tonic water (M = 5.14, SEM = .29 versus
M = 1.76, SD = .30, respectively, a significant main effect
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for beverage, F(1, 149) = 64.32, p< .0001, ηp2 = .30. Women
who expected alcohol reported feeling more intoxicated
compared with those who expected tonic water (M = 3.63,
SEM = .29 versus M = 3.27, SEM = .30, respectively), but
the difference was not statistically significant, F(1,
149) = 0.78, p = .38. Beverage and expectancy did not
interact, F(1, 149) = 0.70, p = .40.
Next, we examined women’s responses regarding the
beverage that they thought they had consumed. Across the
whole sample, 63% thought they had consumed alcohol,
indicating that participants tended to think they had been
given alcohol. The expectancy manipulation was
significantly associated with women’s responses regarding
what beverage they thought they had consumed, χ2 = 14.37,
p < .001, Φ = .30. We also analyzed whether the beverage
women had actually consumed affected their thoughts
regarding the beverage they believed they had consumed.
Women’s responses regarding the beverage they thought they
had consumed were significantly associated with beverage
condition, χ2 = 27.25, p< .001,Φ = .42, with 83% of women
in the alcohol condition reporting they thought they had
consumed alcohol, and 57% in the tonic water beverage
condition reporting they thought they had consumed tonic
water. Thus, women were more likely to think they had
consumed alcohol if they actually did consume alcohol.
We also assessed the relationship between the beverage
women thought they had consumed in relation to the alcohol
expectancy manipulation. In the alcohol beverage condition,
there was no association between the beverage that women
thought they had consumed and expectancy: 90% of those
who had been told alcohol said they thought they had been
given alcohol and 76% of those who had been told tonic
water said that they thought they had been given alcohol.
These results indicate that women in the alcohol condition
generally felt they had been given alcohol, regardless of
what they were told. In the tonic water beverage condition,
expectancy was significantly associated with the beverage
that women thought they had consumed, χ2 (1) = 17.47,
p < .001, Φ = .48, with 65% of those who had been told
alcohol saying that they thought they had been given alcohol
and 82% of those who had been told tonic water saying that
they thought they had been given tonic water. Taken
together, the self-report data suggest that the expectancy
manipulation worked but only in the tonic water beverage
condition. Therefore, in the analyses that follow, we
included whether women thought they had consumed
alcohol as another measure of expectancy.
Alcohol and identification responses
Ideally, we would submit our identification data to a
multilevel loglinear analysis, with beverage, expectancy,
perpetrator, delay, and identification outcome as the factors.
One of the assumptions of multilevel loglinear analysis is
that the expected frequency is greater than 5 in 80% of the
cells (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Our data violated this
assumption, in large part, because participants had a strong
tendency to reject the line-up when the perpetrator was
absent and rarely chose a foil when the perpetrator was
present (Table 2). Therefore, we instead conducted two
logistic regression analyses, with choosing and accuracy as
the outcome measures. We assessed the effects of beverage,
expectancy, delay, and perpetrator in these analyses.
Choosing
Results indicated that inclusion of the study factors produced
a better fit compared with a model without any predictors, χ2
(4) = 24.89, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .20. However,
perpetrator was the only significant predictor in the model,
β = 1.60, SE = .35, Wald (1) = 20.28, p < .001,
Exp(B) = .20. Women were more likely to choose when
the assailant was present rather than absent from the line-
up (65% versus 20%).
The beverage women thought they had consumed was not
associated with choosing, r = .03, p = .74, N = 153.
Accuracy
The model did not fit better than one without any predictors,
χ2 (3) = 7.05, p = .13, Nagelkerke R2 = .06. The only
significant factor was perpetrator, Wald (1) = 4.69, p = .03,
β = .76, SE = .35, Exp(B) = 2.13. Women were more
accurate when the perpetrator was absent compared with
present in the line-up (73% versus 46%).
The beverage women thought they had consumed was not
associated with accuracy, r = .02, p = .76, N = 153.
The confidence–accuracy relationship
Mean confidence
Next, we examined confidence in relation to beverage and
accuracy. Our first analysis examined whether confidence,
on average, varied in relation to alcohol group and accuracy.
We entered confidence into a 2 (beverage) × 2
(perpetrator) × 2 (expectancy) between subjects ANOVA.
We included perpetrator in the analysis because it was a
significant predictor of accuracy in the analyses reported
earlier. Women in the alcohol group reported lower
confidence than their tonic water counterparts (M = 58.08,
SEM = 3.44, versus M = 68.21, SEM = 3.52, respectively),
a significant main effect for beverage, F(1, 145) = 4.22,
p = .04, ηp2 = .03. No other main effects and no interaction
Table 2. Proportions of identification responses by beverage group,
expectancy, and identification outcome
Expected alcohol Expected tonic water
Consumed tonic water Consumed tonic water
PP PA PP PA
(n = 23) (n = 17) (n = 15) (n = 20)
Perpetrator 0.61 — Perpetrator 0.53 —
Filler 0.09 0.41 Filler 0.07 0.20
Reject 0.30 0.59 Reject 0.40 0.80
Expected alcohol Expected tonic water
Consumed alcohol Consumed alcohol
PP PA PP PA
(n = 19) (n = 21) (n = 23) (n = 17)
Perpetrator 0.42 — Perpetrator 0.63 —
Filler 0.16 0.19 Filler 0.17 0.31
Reject 0.42 0.81 Reject 0.32 0.69
Note. PP, perpetrator present; PA, perpetrator absent.
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effects were significant. Expectancy did not affect
confidence levels (Mtold alcohol = 62.37, SD = 31.35, versus
Mtold tonic water = 64.38, SD = 29.58), t(151) = .40, p = .68.
We also analyzed whether the beverage women thought they
had consumed affected confidence ratings and found no
association, F(1, 151) = 0.54, p > .05.
In sum, alcohol consumption, but not alcohol expectancy,
was associated with lower confidence levels overall. But, did
confidence–accuracy calibration vary depending on whether
participants had consumed alcohol? To address this
question, we turned to our calibration tests.
Calibration analyses
Figure 1 plots calibration curves for the alcohol and tonic
water groups for choosers and nonchoosers, holding constant
expectancy. The top panel shows the results for those who
expected vodka, and the bottom panel shows the results for
those who expected tonic water. We collapsed across
confidence levels (the x-axis) in the analysis to stabilize the
functions. Each data point reflects the average accuracy rate
that was observed for the given confidence level range. To
assist with assessing overconfidence versus underconfidence,
an ideal calibration line has been drawn. The point that is
leftmost on the ideal line corresponds to the 10–40%
confidence range. Here, 25% is plotted for accuracy. If
calibration is perfect, average accuracy should be 25%,
because 25% is the midpoint of the 10–40% range. Likewise,
average accuracy ideally should be 60% for the 50–70%
confidence range and 90% for the 80–100% confidence range.
Note that when a data point falls above the ideal line,
underconfidence is indicated (i.e., identification accuracy is
higher on average than witnesses thought it would be given
their confidence ratings), whereas when a data point falls
below the perfect calibration line, overconfidence is indicated
(i.e., identification accuracy is lower on average than witnesses
thought it would be given their confidence ratings).
As can be seen in Figure 1, the pattern of results for those
who consumed alcohol versus tonic is similar, both when
participants expected vodka (top panel) and when they
expected tonic (bottom panel). In all groups, there was a
tendency towards underconfidence at the lowest confidence
levels and overconfidence at the highest confidence levels,
which is similar to past research. There is no evidence that
alcohol consumption or expecting to consume alcohol resulted
in worse calibration, however. Descriptively speaking, those
who expected alcohol and consumed it were underconfident
at the 50–70% level, while all other groups were
overconfident. However, the overlapping error bars indicate
that these differences are not statistically significant. For those
who expected tonic (bottom panel), the confidence–accuracy
relationship was also similar for those who consumed alcohol
compared with those who did not. Further, the data plots in the
top and bottom panels of Figure 1 were compared to assess
possible expectancy effects. Again, the error bars overlapped,
which indicates that expectancy did not systematically affect
the confidence–accuracy relationship.
We also examined the confidence–accuracy relationship as
a function of beverage separately for those participants who
indicated that they thought that they had consumed alcohol,
and these data are reported in Figure 2. As shown, the error
bars overlap, once again demonstrating that the confidence–
accuracy relationship was similar across beverage groups.
We did not examine the confidence–accuracy relationship for
participants who did not believe that they had consumed
alcohol because of sample size limitations.
We further examined the confidence–accuracy
relationship using other approaches. We computed the
calibration statistic (C) to index the extent to which each
beverage group differed from perfect calibration, with the
index value ranging from 0, indicating perfect calibration,
to 1, indicating poor calibration. We also calculated the
overconfidence/underconfidence measure (O/U) for each
beverage group, which indexes the overall tendency of
Figure 1. Mean accuracy by confidence level and beverage
condition. Participants who were told they would consume vodka
are plotted in the top panel, while those who were told tonic water
are plotted in the bottom panel. The dashed line indicates perfect
calibration. Error bars ±1 SEM
Figure 2. Mean accuracy by confidence level and beverage
condition for participants who believed that they would consume
vodka. The dashed line indicates perfect calibration. Error bars ±1
SEM
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participants to respond with confidence that is greater or less
than is warranted by their accuracy level. The O/U measure
ranges from 1, indicating extreme underconfidence, to
+1, indicating extreme overconfidence. Finally, we also
calculated the Normalized Resolution Index (NRI), which
ranges from 0, indicating no discrimination between correct
and incorrect identification decisions, to 1, indicating perfect
discrimination. We collapsed across alcohol expectancy in
these analyses because expectancy was not significant in
any previous analyses.
Table 3 shows the C, O/U, and NRI statistics for the tonic
water and the alcohol groups. As can be seen, the two
beverage groups performed similarly on the measures. The
tendency towards greater overconfidence by the tonic water
compared with the alcohol group is reflected in the O/U
statistics; however, inspection of the 95% CIs indicates that
this difference was not statistically significant.
DISCUSSION
We tested whether alcohol intoxication during encoding
impairs line-up identification accuracy and confidence–
accuracy calibration. We found that identification accuracy
did not vary depending on whether participants had
consumed alcohol, in line with past research (Hagsand
et al., 2013; Harvey et al., 2013; Kneller & Harvey, 2016;
Yuille & Tollestrup, 1990). We also found that women were
more confident in their identification decision if they made
an accurate as opposed to inaccurate identification. Further,
women who had consumed tonic water rather than alcohol
were more confident about the accuracy of their
identification decision overall, regardless of accuracy.
Calibration analyses suggested that confidence is predictive
of accuracy, regardless of whether women had consumed
alcohol or tonic. We discuss these findings in turn.
Our finding that alcohol did not affect the accuracy of line-
up identification is among a growing list of studies finding
no effect of alcohol on participant witness’ ability to make
accurate identifications from a line-up (e.g., Hagsand et al.,
2013; Harvey et al., 2013; Kneller & Harvey, 2016; Yuille
& Tollestrup, 1990). One reason why alcohol may not have
affected identification accuracy in this study and the others is
because the doses employed were not high enough to cause
memory impairment. Participants in the Dysart et al.
(2002) field study were more intoxicated, with a mean blood
alcohol level of 0.09% in the high alcohol condition (range:
0.04–0.20%), which may account for why they found an
alcohol-related decrease in showup identification accuracy.
Another reason why we may not have found alcohol effects
is that intoxicated and sober participants focused their
attention on the perpetrator rather than on more peripheral
aspects of the scenario. The alcohol myopia theory
framework predicts that alcohol restricts attention to the
most salient aspects of a scenario. In this case, any negative
impact that alcohol may have had on participants’ ability to
attend and encode may have been offset by increased
attention to and rehearsal of the rape perpetrator. We have
found support for this idea in our previous work, which
showed that sober and intoxicated women were better able
to remember information about the perpetrator compared
with more peripheral aspects of a sexual assault scenario
(e.g., bystanders; Flowe, Takarangi, Humphries, & Wright,
2016). As others have noted, however, it is difficult to
determine which aspects of a scene are considered to be
central and peripheral, and the amount of attention paid to
central and peripheral items might depend on the complexity
of the particular stimulus materials employed (e.g., Harvey
et al., 2013).
Further, the hypervigilance hypothesis predicts alcohol
and alcohol expectancy leads women to pay greater attention
in potentially risky scenarios. We did not find support for
this, however, as sober and intoxicated women did not differ
in their identification accuracy, regardless of whether they
expected alcohol. It is possible that we did not find a
hypervigilance enhancement in identification accuracy
because the perpetrator was presented before participants
deemed the scenario to be potentially risky. Even if
participants who expected alcohol paid increased attention
when the sexual activity occurred, this would have occurred
after the perpetrator’s appearance was encoded. Needless to
say, further research is required to clarify what conditions
lead to hypervigilance.
In other alcohol research investigating line-up
identification confidence, participants who had consumed
alcohol as opposed to no alcohol have been found to report,
on average, lower confidence (Harvey et al., 2013) and lower
confidence for incorrect identifications (Yuille & Tollestrup,
1990), whereas other studies have reported null findings
(Hagsand et al., 2013; Kneller & Harvey, 2016). In our
study, we found that women reported lower confidence for
inaccurate compared with accurate identifications, regardless
of whether they were alcohol-intoxicated during encoding.
Further, participants who were sober compared with
intoxicated reported higher levels confidence overall,
regardless of identification accuracy. These results suggest
that women who had consumed alcohol were, generally
speaking, underconfident, as they were just as accurate at
identifying the perpetrator as those who had consumed tonic
water.
Calibration analyses were undertaken to shed light on the
effects of alcohol on metacognition. The optimality
Table 3. Calibration statistics by beverage group, choosers and nonchoosers combined
Consumed tonic water Consumed alcohol
Value Jackknife SE 95% CI Value Jackknife SE 95% CI
O/U 0.32 0.06 0.43 to 0.20 0.40 0.06 0.52 to 0.28
C 0.07 0.15 0.22 to 0.36 0.04 0.12 0.17 to 0.27
NRI 0.03 0.03 0.03 to 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 to 0.14
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hypothesis (Bothwell et al., 1987; Deffenbacher, 1980)
predicts better confidence–accuracy calibration for sober
compared with intoxicated participants. Our findings,
however, were not in line with the optimality hypothesis,
because the confidence–accuracy relationship did not vary
across beverage conditions. We did, however, find a trend
for those who expected alcohol and consumed it to be
slightly underconfident at the midrange of the confidence
scale, while all the other groups were overconfident.
While it is important to remember that this difference
was not statistically significant, Yuille and Tollestrup
(1990) also reported a stronger confidence–accuracy
relationship if participants had consumed alcohol as
opposed to no alcohol. The ‘theory-based’ confidence
judgment model proposes that under some circumstances,
overconfidence will be reduced because participants take
into account factors that influence memory when making
their confidence judgments. Given our null findings, we
are not able to rule out this hypothesis (Palmer, Brewer
et al., 2013). Given Yuille and Tollestrup’s (1990)
findings, however, it seems that the theory-based model
might better account for the findings to date on the
confidence–accuracy relationship in intoxicated
participants than the optimality hypothesis.
We also found evidence that the physiological effects of
alcohol were driving women’s confidence ratings. Namely,
we varied alcohol expectancy and did not find evidence that
identification accuracy or confidence was affected by the
mere belief that one had consumed alcohol. These null
results, however, may have arisen from the way in which
we manipulated alcohol expectancy. Every woman in our
study consumed their beverage from a vodka-rimmed cup
that also contained vodka-soaked limes. This was performed
to (i) increase the believability of the alcohol expectancy
manipulation for those who were consuming tonic alone,
but who were told that they had been given alcohol, and
(ii) hold alcohol sensory cues (i.e., smell) constant across
all experimental groups. However, the smell of alcohol
probably led women in our tonic water group to overestimate
the likelihood that they had consumed alcohol. We suggest
that future research investigating expectancy effects include
two types of tonic water control groups: One group should
be told that they are consuming alcohol, but they should be
given tonic water alone, without any alcohol sensory cues.
The other group should be told that they are consuming
alcohol, but they should be given tonic water along with
alcohol sensory cues. To the extent that the mere belief that
one has consumed alcohol decreases confidence, people in
the control group who are exposed to alcohol sensory cues
should report relatively low confidence compared with the
other control group.
Our study has limitations. First, owing to the complexity
and large amount of resources necessary for carrying out this
type of research, our sample size—although large relative to
most other studies conducted to date on this topic (Table 1)
—would ideally have been larger. We hope that other
laboratories will replicate our studies and, perhaps, that a
meta-analysis across studies will be conducted. Second, for
ethical reasons, the scenario was presented in a written
format, accompanied by a photograph of the assailant, rather
than in say, a video format. On the one hand, one could
argue that the psychological realism of our approach was
quite high (Mook, 1983). On the other hand, like with most
other psychology research, we have no way of knowing
whether the memory processes elicited by our procedures
are externally valid. We know of no research that can settle
the issue. Third, victims in actual cases may be considerably
more alcohol-intoxicated than our participants were and have
ingested alcohol as well as other drugs. A recent study by
Hagemann et al. (2013) measured serum blood alcohol
concentrations for real world rape victims who consulted to
a Sexual Assault Centre within 12 hours after the assault.
They performed back-calculations to estimate BAC at the
time of the assault and found a median BAC of 0.20%
(range: 0.04–0.39%). Additionally, 5% had ethanol along
with another drug in their system (e.g., benzodiazapines).
We would encourage other researchers to conduct research
in public houses (e.g., following Dysart et al., 2002) because
it permits researchers to capture memory performance under
relatively high levels of intoxication than might be feasible
or ethical in the laboratory. Fourth, the accuracy levels we
observed may be specific to the particular materials we
employed. It is reasonable to expect that identification
accuracy varies in relation to encoding conditions. In the
present study, the hypothetical assailant was presented in a
photograph during encoding, and participants viewed the
photograph for about 8–10 seconds. Despite the fact that
our exposure time was relatively short, identification
accuracy was relatively high. Future studies should
systematically control exposure duration length, perhaps
tracking eye movements to ensure that intoxicated and sober
participants attend to the face for the same length of time.
Studies that employ longer exposure times are needed to
estimate real world accuracy levels. Fifth, we did not
systematically vary whether participants were tested in a
sober versus intoxicated state because of resource
limitations. Even though our participants were reportedly
sober when they completed the recognition measures, they
completed the recognition measures online, and hence, we
could not breathalyze them to verify that they were in fact
sober. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that state
dependency affected identification accuracy or confidence.
Nevertheless, state dependency effects tend to be small and
idiosyncratic (Duka, Weissenborn, & Dienes, 2001;
Weissenborn & Duka, 2000) and seem to affect recall rather
than recognition (Eich, 1980). Sixth, we did not find that
women were less accurate if they were tested after a 7-day
compared with a 1-day delay. We suggest that future studies
employ a longer delay between event encoding and the line-
up identification test. Finally, we tested participants online.
Previous line-up research finds a similar pattern of results
with respect to discrimination accuracy for participants
who are tested online versus in the laboratory (e.g., Flowe,
Takarangi et al., 2016; Gronlund et al., 2009; Mickes et al.,
2012). It is entirely conceivable, however, that decision bias
(i.e., the willingness to identify someone as a suspect from a
line-up, which is a separate issue from discrimination
accuracy) might differ depending on testing context. Further,
unlike a laboratory or police environment, testing conditions
(e.g., noise and other distractions, time of day) cannot be
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precisely controlled when participants are tested online, and
this may have affected accuracy and decision bias.
Bearing in mind these limitations, how might our results
inform investigative practice? Alcohol would seem to be an
especially pertinent issue to consider when assessing
whether a witness’ identification is likely to be accurate.
The relevance of the issue is reflected in a survey of
psychology experts, which found that 90% of respondents
agreed that alcohol impairs memory performance (Kassin,
Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001). Further, 61% of
respondents on this survey indicated that they would testify
about it, 79% indicated there was a sufficient research basis,
and 95% indicated that the phenomenon was common sense
(Kassin et al., 2001). Mock jurors have also been shown to
perceive intoxicated victims and bystanders as being
cognitively impaired and less able to make accurate
identifications when evaluating summaries of sexual battery
and aggravated sexual assault cases (Evans & Schreiber
Compo, 2010). However, the results of the current study
add to a growing body of research (Hagsand et al., 2013;
Harvey et al., 2013; Kneller & Harvey, 2016; Yuille &
Tollestrup, 1990) which finds that people who are alcohol-
intoxicated (BAC = 0.04–0.11%) compared with sober
during encoding can be just as accurate on a line-up test.
To put these BAC levels into perspective, a BAC of 0.08%
is equivalent to consuming about four regular sized alcoholic
drinks (beer, wine, or shot) in an hour. Our work, along with
others, suggests that investigators should not automatically
exclude line-up identification evidence or discount a
confidence statement because it was obtained from a witness
who was intoxicated with alcohol during the crime. Having
said this, the witness’ intoxication state at the time of
identification test is an important factor to consider. Like
the studies before us, we found no differences between
sober and intoxicated participants when they were tested
between 24 hours to a week after the crime. An
outstanding issue in need of empirical investigation is
whether witnesses, if they are intoxicated during the
line-up test, can follow line-up instructions (such as
warnings that the perpetrator might not present in the
line-up, e.g., Clark, 2005) or whether they are more
subject to potentially biasing influences during the line-up
(e.g., Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, 2009). Further,
previous work suggests that witnesses should not be
tested with a showup when they are intoxicated, because
intoxicated compared with sober witnesses are more
likely on average to false alarm on a showup test (Dysart
et al., 2002). Finally, our results demonstrate that, for
sober and intoxicated women alike, identifications made
with low compared with high confidence are more likely
to be incorrect. This result is particularly important for
criminal investigations. In post-conviction DNA cases,
witnesses expressed low levels of confidence in their
identification at the time that they took the line-up test
(Garrett, 2011). Yet, over time, witnesses became
increasingly confident that they had identified the
perpetrator. This finding further underscores the necessity
of taking confidence at the time that the identification is
made to ensure that confidence is a valid indicator of
memory strength (e.g., Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002).
In sum, we found that women who had consumed alcohol
(BAC = 0.08%) compared with tonic before encoding were
just as able to identify the rape assailant from a line-up from
1 to 7 days later. Women who had consumed alcohol as
opposed to tonic water tended to identify the assailant with
lower confidence, however. Even still, confidence and
accuracy were related in a similar manner for both the
alcohol and tonic water groups.
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